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MURDER ON MANEUVER: EXPLORING GREEN-ON-BLUE ATTACKS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
Since May 2007, green-on-blue attacks, or “insider attacks”, in Afghanistan have 
killed over 140 coalition troops and injured over 180 (Roggio & Lundquist, 2013). 
Green-on-blue attacks function as a case specific version of blue-on-blue attacks or 
“friendly fire”, where friendly military forces fire upon each other accidentally. In the 
case of green-on-blue attacks of interest here, “green” represents the members of the 
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF; or in some cases an insurgent imposter) 
targeting “blue” forces, or the members of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). Blue-on-blue attacks primarily involve air-to-ground or artillery fire and mostly 
take place during active combat situations (Shrader, 1992). Green-on-blue attacks, 
however, usually involve small arms fire and occur on ISAF bases (Ahmad, 2017). 
Therefore, it is feasible to form an assumption that while blue-on-blue attacks are 
inherently accidental, green-on-blue attacks do not seem to share the same accidental 
characteristics. 
 Within the wider discussion of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, there is a 
fundamental disagreement between those who state that victims know (and often work 
with) their perpetrator (e.g., Bordin, 2011) and those who view such attacks as 
predominantly perpetrated by strangers (Sageman, 2013).  To further confound the issue, 
little open-source data exists on such attacks or their perpetrators, and, with the exception 
of Anderson (2013), no theoretical explanations have been forwarded to clarify the 
underlying psychological mechanisms at play.  
Green-on-blue  
2 
 With this in mind, the first goal of this paper is to analyse data (collected via 
open-source data coding) that focuses on green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the 
perpetrators, the victims, and the attack tactics. Second, beyond the proximate motivation 
for these attacks (e.g. personal or insurgent), no research has sought to identify any 
environmental indicators for these attacks.  As such, this paper tests if wider correlates of 
insurgent violence (namely the number of civilian casualties caused by international 
forces; see Condra et al., 2010) also predict the occurrence of green-on-blue attacks in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Literature on Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan 
Green-on-blue attacks emerged as a threat to ISAF personnel in 2007, before 
surging in frequency and lethality in 2011 and 2012 and declining throughout 2013 
(Long, 2013). Green-on-blue attacks posed a renewed challenge to the efforts for 
achieving peace in Afghanistan because these attacks undermined the morale of ISAF 
troops and the scope for a combined strategy between ANSF and ISAF. These attacks 
also had far-reaching repercussions for the country’s transition to much-needed peace and 
stability (Long, 2013). Furthermore, regardless of whether the Taliban actually 
orchestrated these attacks, the Head of the Supreme Council Mullah Omar immediately 
supported them, claiming that the Taliban “cleverly infiltrated” the ranks of the enemy 
and released videos praising the heroic perpetrators. The Taliban’s use of green-on-blue 
attacks as propaganda, and their strategic re-structuring to encourage defections, 
amplified the message that these attacks were becoming increasingly successful at 
tactical and operational levels throughout the final stages of ISAF’s campaign in 
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Afghanistan. Since the surge of green-on-blue attacks in 2011 and 2012, trust between 
ISAF and ANSF, as well as ANSF’s readiness to assume full security responsibility, 
significantly decreased (Dyrud & Moradian, 2012).   
The Taliban’s claims for responsibility in green-on-blue attacks were often 
exaggerated. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) estimated that only 25% of 
green-on-blue attacks were the result of Taliban infiltration (Tupper, 2013), emphasizing 
that the majority stemmed from personal grievances and escalated personal 
confrontations between members of the ISAF and members of ANSF (Bordin, 2011; 
Roggio & Lundquist, 2012, DoD, 2013). Research by Dr. Marc Sageman, however, 
challenged this finding. Sageman’s findings, based on interviews with detained 
perpetrators, put collective grievances at the heart of such attacks, showing that in the 
vast majority of cases, ANSF attackers fired at “strangers” who they did not work 
alongside (Sageman, 2013). According to Sageman’s research, none of the 49 recorded 
green-on-blue attacks were the result of a personal confrontation, and only 7 of the 
perpetrators were co-opted by insurgent forces.  
Currently, Armstrong (2013) has produced the only academic research that 
specifically explores the dynamics of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan. Developed 
using in-depth case studies of NATO efforts to partner with ANSF, this research found 
that cross-cultural friction and personal stress are clear contributing factors.  
Secondly, Armstrong (2013) proposed there were three different “triggers” for 
attacks: enemy-induced, threat or insult-induced, and stress-induced. Armstrong also 
proposed an analytical framework for green-on-blue attacks that demonstrates the inter-
relation of perpetrator “triggers”, attacker motivation, and outcome. Here, he identified 
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that offenders with different motivations (anti-NATO/Western vs., reputational vs., 
religion vs., power vs., economic) will undertake different types of green-on-blue attack 
(“premeditated attack” vs. “violent behavioral response”). That said, it should be 
highlighted that Armstrong (2013) presented no behavioral data in support of these 
typologies.  
 
Civilian casualties as a correlate of insurgent violence 
Contemporary conflicts are often conducted amongst the civilian population, 
where gaining and maintaining the popular support of residents dictates the likelihood of 
strategic success (Boyle, 2010). From the counterinsurgent perspective, gaining 
population support requires the provision of services, material assistance, and restraint on 
the use of force to ensure minimal harm to the civilians they are meant to protect. 
Civilian casualties, therefore, present a dilemma because stability requires security, 
which usually requires the counterinsurgent force to target insurgents who may be 
operating within and around the civilian population. Thus, targeting insurgents invariably 
leads to civilian deaths and security must come at the cost of support, or vice versa. 
Civilian casualties, therefore, represent a liability in the critical battle for “hearts and 
minds” and contravene counter-insurgency (COIN) principles.  
Additionally, civilian casualties have a significant effect upon ISAFs’ partnership 
with, and development of, the ANSF. In the long-term, developing the ANSF is the most 
important strategic goal (Williams, 2013). Yet, civilian casualties caused by ISAF have 
had a significant impact on the working partnership between ISAF and ANSF personnel 
(Bordin, 2011). Research exploring issues among ISAF and ANSF inter-operability 
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identifies civilian casualties as a critically important issue (Bordin, 2011, p. 33). Among 
ANSF participants in Bordin’s study, civilian casualties appeared across virtually every 
focus group, and participants stated a notable lack of concern for the safety of civilians by 
ISAF, with an emphasis on killing insurgents and self-protection (Bordin, 2011, p.34). Of 
greater concern is that even while ISAF-caused civilian casualties have been dropping , 
ANSF personnel were still prone to believe that ISAF had been the cause of the 
casualties, even when presented with extensive evidence to the contrary (Bordin, 2011, 
p.34). Recently, Bohannon (2014) speculated on a specific link between civilian 
casualties and green-on-blue attacks in that “anger at civilian deaths caused by the 
military may be driving an increase in ‘green-on-blue’” (p. 724). 
Civilian casualties also enrage the local population, encouraging insurgent 
recruitment (Condra et al., 2010). For example, in March 2007, an ISAF airstrike killed 
nine members of one Afghan family, resulting in protests by hundreds of Nangarhar 
University students (Dadkhah, 2008). Each tragedy unquestionably enflames the Afghan 
public’s emotions, erodes their goodwill by breeding resentment, and adds to the 
increasingly pessimistic mood of the populace (Condra et al., 2010). Anecdotally, civilian 
casualties are often associated with insurgent recruitment (see Nadery & Humayoon, 
2008) and recent research has added statistical support to this view. Using civilian 
casualty and SIGACT1 data from Iraq and Afghanistan, Condra et al. (2010) identified a 
“revenge effect,” finding that for every ISAF-caused incident that caused 2 civilian 
casualties (within an average sized Afghan-district), there was 1 more insurgent attack 
                                                        
1 SIGACTs (Significant Activities): These are reported violent incidents ranging from 
threatening letters to key leaders to major assaults on coalition outposts (Connable, 
2012). 
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over the next 6 weeks.  This relationship was found to be specific to Afghanistan and was 
not present in Iraq (where it was observed that the increased population density and 
urbanization may potentially mitigate insurgent recruitment). Of greater importance, then, 
is that the negative effect of civilian casualties on the population is subject to in-group 
distortion effects. ISAF-caused civilian casualties resulted in decreased support, yet this 
punitive perception was not transferred to the Taliban after they caused civilian casualties 
(Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013).  
Given the inter-relation between civilian casualties caused by ISAF and insurgent 
violence in Afghanistan, and the known role of civilian casualties as a grievance to 
members of the ANSF, it is viable to suppose that civilian casualties caused by ISAF may 
play a role in motivating members of the ANSF to commit green-on-blue attacks against 
their ISAF partners. Given this view, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: As the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF increases, the number of 
green-on-blue attacks will also increase.  
H2: As the number of civilian casualties caused within a given Regional Command 
(RC) increase, the likelihood of a green-on-blue attack within that RC will also increase. 
 
Data and Methods 
Green-on-blue database 
Sample. One hundred and twelve cases of green-on-blue attacks were identified 
via open-source data searching. We define green-on-blue attacks in line with Long (2013) 
in that they are instances in which a member (or members) of the ANSF (or Taliban 
imposters) purposefully targets (successfully or unsuccessfully) a member (or members) 
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of ISAF. Instances in which members of the “blue” forces were killed by accidental 
shootings and weapon errors from the “green” forces were not included in this study as 
these are not reflective of the wider “green-on-blue” phenomena which involves an 
individual with intent to kill. 
This sample was identified from currently existing lists of green-on-blue attacks 
(e.g., Bordin, 2011) and then expanded through open-source searching for cases of green-
on-blue attacks in Afghanistan (using open-source search tools and terms such as “green-
on-blue”, “fratricide” and “insider attack” and/or “insider threat”). From here, a series of 
cases were identified which were confirmed to meet the definition of green-on-blue 
attacks provided above. This sample is larger than that reported by Roggio and Lundquist 
(2013), but it is similar in size to the number of insider attacks reported by the United 
States Department of Defense (DoD, 2013). Thus, when we talk about green-on-blue 
events, our unit of analysis is the “attack” itself (unless otherwise stated).  
Overall, the sample of green-on-blue events for this project includes 112 events 
that occurred in Afghanistan between 6th May 2007 and 26th October 2013. All events 
included the targeting, or attempted targeting, of ISAF forces by members of the ANSF. 
This database also includes, where possible, those events that resulted in no casualties.   
From these 112 cases of green-on-blue attacks, we identified 153 individuals who 
had perpetrated (or attempted to perpetrate) a green-on-blue attack and 157 members of 
ISAF personnel who had been the victim of a green-on-blue attack. For a full outline of 
these 112 cases of green-on-blue attacks, see Appendix A. 
Data collection and analysis. To collect data for this project, a codebook of 87 
variables was developed which covered a range of binary, categorical, and string 
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variables related to the green-on-blue event, perpetrator(s), and victim(s) (an outline of 
data pertaining to the perpetrators and victims are provided in Appendix B). This 
codebook was populated through extensive open-source searching. The data for this 
codebook came from open-source media reporting as well as Government (“grey”) 
literature, and (although this was rarer) official reviews of a green-on-blue attack.  
Information sources were not exclusively written in English (online translators were used 
when needed), but most of the media-reports were written in English due to the majority 
of victims being from the United States or United Kingdom. The variables in this 
codebook related to three distinct aspects of each green-on-blue attack: the attack itself 
(and its tactics), the victim, and the perpetrators. Specifically, this codebook contained 
data points for:  
The green-on-blue attack: The codebook contained 33 variables pertaining to 
when, where, and how the green-on-blue attack unfolded. Two independent coders coded 
each observation separately. After an observation was coded, an independent member of 
the project team reconciled these results. The percentage similarity between coders was 
87.6%. In line with similar research which uses open-source information to generate data 
points (e.g., Gill et al., 2013; Horgan, Shortland, Abbascianno & Walsh, 2016), coding 
for this project required a “hard no” or a “hard yes.” Thus, the absence of a variable could 
not be used to infer that it was not there. Instead, for a variable to be coded as “absent” 
there would need to be a statement which conformed this.  
For example, the lack of reporting if the soldier knew their attacker before the 
attack could not be used as evidence that they did not (even though we may assume that 
if they did, this would be reported). Instead, for us to confirm that the soldier and the 
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attacker did not have a previous relationship, open-source reporting would have to 
include a phrase such as “the soldier had no relationship with the attacker prior to the 
attack.” This is an important point because it likely skews the data presented here because 
it means that the number of “NOs” presented in this research is likely a smaller number 
than the true number of “NOs,” whereas the number of “YESs” is likely a truer reflection 
of the real number (based on the view that in most cases the presence of something is 
more newsworthy than its absence; see Horgan et al., 2016). 
Independent Variables 
Regional command (RC). Data are grouped by RC (North, West, South, East, 
and Capital). To estimate the fixed effects of each RC, we include a dummy variable for 
each. The dummy variable for each RC is abbreviated with the first letter of that area. For 
example, the regional command for the North is abbreviated as RC-N.  
Civilian casualties and victims. This research used civilian casualty data 
collected by the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell/Mitigation Team (CCTC/CCTM) and 
released via Science (see Shortland & Bohannon, 2014). This is the official database of 
civilian deaths and injuries between 2008 and 2014 and contains the number of civilians 
killed and injured by ISAF per month within each RC (North, South, South-West, 
Capital, East and West).2  
Troop density. As troop presence in Afghanistan increases, the opportunity to 
commit a green-on-blue attack does as well (i.e. if the number of ISAF troops in 
Afghanistan equals zero it is impossible to perpetrate a green-on-blue attack). Troop 
density figures were obtained from ISAF placemat reports and UK Ministry of Defense 
                                                        
2 In 2010, the provinces of Helmand and Nimroz were split from RC-South into RC-Southwest.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, both commands are considered as a single entity; RC-South.    
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progress reports for Afghanistan. Data was integrated across these two sources because 
individually neither one included sufficient data points for analysis. Comparison of 
sequential months within and between the two data sets showed high-levels of internal 
reliability, supporting the validity of integrating these two datasets. While ISAF 
frequently did not publish RC troop estimates, particularly during the 2011–2012 period, 
when RC figures were reported by ISAF, they were considered estimates.3 As such, for 
months missing RC totals, we estimate troop figures based on the disposition of forces 
when the country total was of a similar level and use a last observation carried forward 
method.  
Strategic Adaptation. We include a dummy variable called “strategic 
adaptation” to control for the period during which the Taliban formally announced that 
they had begun to actively recruit green-on-blue attackers and ISAF began to institute 
new policies designed to reduce the occurrence of green-on-blue attacks. It is our 
assumption that the formal announcement by the Taliban that green-on-blue attacks were 
a new “strategy” would increase the likelihood that they would occur, as such this 
dummy variable was included to control for this.  
Dependent Variable 
Green-on-blue attacks. For every month within each RC, the presence or 
absence of a green-on-blue attack was coded dichotomously (1 = at least 1 green-on-blue 
attack, and 0 = no green-on-blue attacks). This allows a model to be constructed that 
provides the probability of at least 1 green-on-blue attack occurring within a given 
month, within a given RC. Furthermore, a binary coding allows for the possibility of 
                                                        
3 The troops variable was also transformed using a log base 2 function in order to reduce the right skewness 
of the distribution of values. 
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unrecorded green-on-blue attacks in months in which at least 1 green-on-blue attack 
occurred. This is an issue that has been raised in public media sources (e.g. Roggio, 
2013).  Binary coding for the presence of a green-on-blue attack, rather than the number 
of attacks, is therefore more robust against issues of reporting accuracy.  
Results 
Descriptive summary of Green-on–blue attacks 
The worst year for green-on-blue attacks was 2012, with 48 attacks countrywide 
and 12 in August 2012 alone. RC-S saw the most green-on-blue attacks with 51, followed 
by RC-E with 32.  RC-C, RC-N, and RC-W experienced fewer green-on-blue attacks 
with 8, 7, and 14 respectively. 
 
Green-on-blue attacks and civilian casualties  
 
The correlation between ISAF civilian casualties and insider attacks at the country 
level was calculated and revealed an r = 0.118 (p < 0.05), thus there is a small, positive 
correlation between these factors. Partial correlations were calculated for the association 
between ISAF civilian casualties and insider attacks. All of the partial correlations were 
small and not significant, meaning that when controlling for RC, the partial correlations 
between ISAF civilian casualties and insider attacks is not statistically significantly 
different than zero.  
In order to estimate a model investigating the effects of civilian casualties on the 
occurrence of green-on-blue attacks, panel data was used organizing variables by month 
and RC.  For this data, we examined the occurrence of green-on-blue attacks within each 
RC at the month level. While we realize that this is a relatively “crude” degree of 
analysis, the recency of this phenomenon precludes the use of more granular data. For 
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example, while Condra et al., (2010) are able to use SIGACT data (a far more temporally 
and geographically defined degree of analysis), this data is not available for the time 
frame we are interested in (specifically the years after 2010).  
Our analysis of green-on-blue was accordingly restricted by the quality of the 
datasets which cover civilian casualties during the most prominent years of green-on-blue 
attacks (2011 – 2013). The most suitable dataset, therefore, is the ISAF civilian casualty 
data (published by Bohannon, 2010; Shortland & Bohannon, 2014). Additionally, troop-
density numbers are released in this format (by month and RC). Consequently, this 
restricted our analysis to RC by month. For the purpose of this analysis, green-on-blue 
attacks represented the number of green-on-blue attacks that occurred within a given RC 
within a given month (from the 1st of the month until the 1st of the next month).  
Logistic Regression  
 The dichotomous outcome measure for the presence/absence of at least one green-
on-blue attack was examined using a logistic regression model. First, the model was run 
including the predictors of interest, as presented in Table 1. Additionally, the odds ratios 
and 95% confidence interval was calculated for Model 1 (see Table 2). A second model 
was then calculated which included an interaction effect between the number of ISAF-
caused civilian casualties and troop density (see Table 1).  
 Based on these analyses, we cannot support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Our analysis 
showed that there was no significant relationship between ISAF-caused civilian casualties 
and the occurrence of green-on-blue attacks, within the same RC and the same month, 
when additional factors were included in the model. Model 1 (see Table 1) shows that 
ISAF caused civilian casualties are not significantly associated with the occurrence of a 
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green-on-blue attack when other factors are taken into account.4 Table 2 shows that for 
every unit increase in ISAF civilian casualties, the odds of a green on blue attack 
decrease by 0.05%, holding all other factors constant. This relationship is not significant.  
 The number of troops within a RC is significantly positively related to the 
occurrence of a green-on-blue attack. Holding all other factors constant, for every two-
fold increase in troop density, the odds of a green-on-blue attack occurring increase by a 
factor of 5.40 (see Table 2). Additionally, there is some evidence that each RC interacts 
differently with green-on-blue attacks. Specifically, when holding troops and civilian 
casualties constant, both RC-S and RC-W were significantly associated with the 
occurrence of a green-on-blue attack. In Model 2 (see Table 1), an interaction effect 
between ISAF-caused civilian casualties and troop density showed no effect on the 
significance of the model.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
 This research explored whether green-on-blue attacks were associated with the 
number of civilian casualties caused by international forces, and hence, the degree to 
which such attacks may reflect patterns of wider insurgent violence (see Condra et al., 
2010). Our analysis does not support the proposed hypotheses about the correlation 
                                                        
4 Civilian casualties were also run as a lag-variable (at 1-month, 3-month and 6-month lags) in order to 
account for the possible time delay between civilian casualties occurring, recruitment into ANSF and 
perpetrating a green-on-blue attack. Again, at a national level there was no significant relationship between 
civilian casualties and the occurrence of green-on-blue attacks at 1-month, 3-month and 6-month lags. 
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between civilian casualties and insider attacks in Afghanistan. Below we discuss the 
theoretical implications, especially as they pertain to the psychological factors that likely 
motivate them. We also discuss the limitations of this research and directions for future in 
this area.   
 It is clear that green-on-blue attacks pose a substantial and almost inexorable 
threat to force protection, the ISAF-ANSF partnership, and (arguably) the strategic 
success in Afghanistan and other future collaborative missions. The analysis of the 
inevitably limited first open-source database showed the heterogeneity of both green-on-
blue perpetrators and their victims, suggesting a demographic diversity that is similar to 
that seen in other insurgent actors (e.g., Reinares, 2004), as well as “lone wolf” terrorists 
(Gill et al., 2014).  
 Our analyses did not find a statistically significant relationship between the 
number civilian casualties caused by ISAF and the occurrence of a green-on-blue attack 
within a given month and within a given RC. This finding implies that green-on-blue 
attacks do not follow the same pattern as wider insurgent violence (which are correlated 
with civilian casualties; see Condra et al., 2010).  
 Instead, this research found that as the number of troops within an RC increased, 
so did the likelihood that a green-on-blue attack would occur. A possible explanation for 
this is that areas with a greater troop density may also have a greater insurgent presence, 
thus increasing the likelihood of infiltration. However, this finding is also unlikely given 
the effect (or lack thereof) of the strategic adaptation variable. The coefficient was small 
and positive (about 0.45-0.46) in both models, but had no significant effect on green-on-
blue attacks. There are two possible explanations for this finding: firstly, the strategic 
Green-on-blue  
15 
adaptation of the Taliban had no effect on the likelihood that a green-on-blue attack 
would occur and secondly, that any positive effect this had was mitigated by the 
increasing counter-methods applied by ISAF (see Reed, 2012). However, what this does 
mean is that it seems that a Taliban willingness to conduct green-on-blue was not related 
to their occurrence. This then places the causal mechanisms for green-on-blue attacks as 
internal to the ISAF/ANSF dynamic.  
 An alternative potential  explanation for the finding that increased troop density 
increases the likelihood that a green-on-blue attack will occur builds on Sageman’s 
(2013) and Armstrong’s (2013) research on contributing factors for green-on-blue 
attacks. Armstrong (2013) proposes that cross-cultural friction plays a role in contributing 
to green-on-blue attacks and Sageman (2013) demonstrates that the majority of ASNF 
attackers fired against strangers. Our data (which should be viewed with reservations 
given the availability of data) provides preliminary support to the view that green-on-blue 
attackers were more likely to target “strangers” or outgroup members. This is in line with 
theories of interpersonal violence that show it is far easier to dehumanize and aggress 
against “faceless strangers” than those we know (Staub, 1999).  
In-groups are often created based on culture, religion, values, and ways of life, 
viewing members of the out-group less positively (Dixon & Levine, 2012). This supports 
the potential explanatory utility of self-categorization theory (SCT), which implies that, 
depending on social context, people can identify themselves in multiple ways and can 
even recategorize former outgroup members as ingroup members (and vice versa). In the 
situation of interest, an increase in troop density (while increasing the opportunity to 
commit a green-on-blue attack) may increase the amount of “cultural frictions” that occur 
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between ANSF and ISAF. Cultural differences and their influence on conflict are 
increasingly being focused on by organizational psychologists and conflict management 
research.  
Conflict is often associated with issues of values and identity (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 2000; Mayer, 2010). Conflict often begins when individuals or groups perceive 
differences and oppositions between themselves and others over interests, beliefs, needs, 
and values (De Dreu et al., 1999). The differences between ISAF and ANSF (especially 
in terms of interests, norms, and beliefs) are well known (see Bordin, 2011), supporting 
the importance of culture-clashes and green-on-blue attacks as a unique manifestation of 
wider cross-cultural organizational conflict. For example, hybridized codes (e.g. accent, 
manners, and cultural differences in non-verbal behaviour; Kyriakides, Virdee, & 
Modood, 2009) can perpetuate intergroup differences and a sense of outgroupness that 
are conducive to attacks against those who are not seen as ingroup members (Dixon, 
Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). As such, it may be that increases in “outgroup” 
troop density amplify the presence of such hybridization codes, strengthening a sense of 
“us” and “them” and facilitating the ease with which a green-on-blue perpetrator views 
members of ISAF as a member of the “outgroup”. ISAF soldiers may be seen as the 
enemy outgroup by those members of the ANSF who commit such attacks, rather than as 
members of the ingroup by those who do not commit such attacks (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).  
Future Research  
Given the tactical and operational impact of green-on-blue attacks and high 
likelihood that future operations will continue to involve partnership with indigenous 
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forces, a viable postulation is that green-on-blue attacks may not be an “Afghanistan-
specific” phenomenon. It is imperative that future research continue to focus on the 
social, organizational, and environmental factors that may play a part in motivating an 
individual to “turn-coat.” For example, there are a host of other variables that may 
motivate green-on-blue attacks that are not accounted for in this research. Arrests, 
destruction of property, and culturally offensive behavior were also stated to be top-tier 
grievances with the ANSF (see Bordin, 2011). Interviews with detained perpetrators of 
green-on-blue attacks highlight the role that events such as the burning of Qu’rans by 
Florida-based pastor Terry Jones and the slaughter of Afghan civilians by Staff Sergeant 
Bales played in their decision to ‘turn coat’ (see CAPS, 2013).  
In order to support future force protection, research needs to begin to unpack the 
many diverse reasons for which members of the ANSF become motivated to undertake a 
green-on-blue attack. Similar to research on wider involvement in terrorist violence, 
research will need to employ a multi-method approach that investigates statistical 
markers and correlates of green-on-blue attacks while also focusing (through qualitative 
research) on the individual, organizational, and environmental factors that pushed or 
pulled members of the ANSF towards undertaking a green-on-blue attack.  
 In response to the emergence of green-on-blue attacks, ISAF and NATO took 
several steps to mitigate the perpetration of such attacks. Firstly, ‘guardian angels’ (i.e., 
officers who watch for possible green-on-blue attackers) were employed to provide 
security to those accompanying Afghan forces. Secondly, the number of joint patrols 
between ISAF and ANSF servicemen in Afghanistan were greatly curbed. Finally, 
background checks were improved to mitigate the risk of green-on-blue incidents (DoD, 
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2013). These security measures are viewed as responsible for the overall decline in the 
number of successful attacks during 2013. It is essential then, that future research further 
explores the effectiveness of these tactics, with special attention being payed to some of 
the potential psychological drivers we have identified above. 
 
Study Limitations 
 Firstly, and most obviously, data available via open-source news reports will be 
inevitably incomplete and suffer a general paucity of certain types of information (such 
as socio-demographic data for the perpetrator). In addition, the nature of material 
reported in the media is likely to be biased with certain types of information being more 
likely to be reported and therefore over-represented in this sample. For example, Horgan, 
Shortland, Abbascianno and Walsh (2016) found that the type of terrorism that an 
individual engaged in affected the quality and quantity of media reporting on that 
individual. To apply this point here, it is perhaps viable to propose that issues such as 
“known relationships” to their victims were more hotly reported in the media, given that 
a significant degree of the political and popular narrative around these types of events 
was centered on the degree to which the attackers did, or did not know their victims.   
 Furthermore, while green-on-blue attacks began to appear in 2007, it was not until 
later that they became widely reported on, suggesting that there is likely a bias in quality 
and quantity of reporting between the earliest cases and the more recent ones. However, 
for many of the early cases, the results of formal investigations are released, providing a 
fuller picture of the event and increasing the degree of confidence we can place in data 
relating these cases. In coding data for this research, researchers required a “hard” yes or 
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no. Meaning that for a data point to be coded as present there had to be evidence stating 
this directly (and that the absence of reporting could not be used to infer an absence of 
this variable). In practice, therefore, many cases may exist where the absence of a 
relationship goes unreported, likely decreasing the number of “NOs”  counted in the data, 
whereas the number of “YESs” will be a more accurate representation.  
 In addition, the troops variable may not be an ideal metric for “opportunity.” In 
2012, ISAF began to institute measures that restricted interaction between ANSF and 
ISAF personnel in many situations. Restricting access to weapons on post and limiting 
the number of partnered operations represent attempts to reduce the opportunity to 
perpetrate a green-on-blue attack. The troop variable does not fully measure these 
changes in procedure or access that ANSF personnel have to ISAF personnel or 
weaponry (regardless of force density). For example, during the period in which these 
security procedures were implemented, the ISAF contingent in Afghanistan was at its 
highest levels, while opportunity was perhaps at one of its lowest points. In future 
research (and dependent upon access to data), metrics such as partnered operations would 
be an important addition.  
Conclusions 
In spite of the 157 killed in green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, academic 
research has offered little in support of explanation and prevention, prompting us to 
attempt to fill at least a part of this knowledge gap. We provided the first analysis aimed 
at helping predict such attacks, revealing a complex, rather than a simple and ‘neat’, 
picture. In doing so, we present important data about the nature of such attacks (e.g. who 
perpetrates them, how, and whom is targeted).  
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In addition, we also suggest that green-on-blue attacks may not adhere to the same 
patterns and predictors as wider insurgent violence. These analyses reinforce the 
importance of future research in this area. We propose the potential utility of exploring 
“identity” and perceptions of in-group and out-group. However, there are a host of 
limitations with the data presented here and, while bearing these limitations in mind, it is 
clear that our analysis poses many questions for future research. In the absence of any 
other data or analysis in this area, open-source information should not be discounted from 
scientific analysis. Elsewhere, a host of open-source data-collection efforts have recently 
been undertaken to explore under-researched areas of national security. Given the paucity 
of analysis and research on green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, coupled with the 
potential threat such attacks could pose in the future, leveraging open-source data to 
construct an empirical analysis of the nature of the attacks, perpetrators, and victims is an 
important first step.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Models 1 and 2 
 
Model (1) (2) 
DV: GOB Binary GOB Binary 
Constant -23.8752*** 
(4.717) 
-22.6643*** 
(5.5035) 
ISAF CIVCAS at t -0.0046 
(0.0138) 
-0.1109 
(0.2603) 
Log2 Troops 1.6864*** 
(0.3639) 
1.5937*** 
(0.4229) 
Strategic Adaption 0.4558 
(0.3403) 
0.4582 
(0.3397) 
RC-N -0.3823 
(0.5832) 
-0.3528 
(0.5862) 
RC-E -1.2806 
(0.8065) 
-1.1168 
(0.8946) 
RC-S -2.6221* 
(1.0970) 
-2.4717* 
(1.1523) 
RC-W 1.4280** 
(0.5483) 
1.3887* 
(0.5560) 
ISAF CIVCAS at t * Troops  0.0071 
(0.0174) 
Observations 350 350 
Nagelkerke R2 0.250 0.250 
LR x2 62.38*** 62.56*** 
Standard errors in parentheses, ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05, (GOB = Green on 
Blue, ISAF = International Security Assistance Force, CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties, 
RC = Regional Command) 
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Table 2: Model 1 Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals 
 Odds Ratio Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Constant 4.28e-11 4.13e-15 4.45e-7 
ISAF CIVCAS at t 0.9954 0.9688 1.0228 
Log2 Troops 5.4002 2.6464 11.0197 
Strategic Adaption 1.5774 0.0896 3.0734 
RC-N 0.6823 0.2176 2.1397 
RC-E 0.2779 0.0572 1.3501 
RC-S 0.0726 0.00846 0.6238 
RC-W 4.1703 1.4238 12.2146 
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Appendix A: Outline of 112 instances of Green-on-Blue Attacks 
 
N Year Province  ANSF PERP Attack By  CF Nation   
KIA 
 
WIA 
Perp Status  
1 2007 Kabul ANA  SAF US 2 2 Killed 
2 2007 Herat ANA  SAF US 1 0 Detained 
3 2007 Helmand ANA  SAF  ISAF 
(US?) 
0 0 Detained 
4 2008 Kunar AUP SAF  US 1 0 Killed 
5 2008 Paktiya AUP SAF  US 1 4 Killed 
6 2008 Paktiya AUP SAF + Gren  US 1 0 Killed 
7 2009 Balkh ANA SAF  US 2 2 Killed 
8 2009 Kabul AUP CMD IED  US 2 0 Detained, 
Escaped 
9 2009 Kapisa AUP SVBIED  US 3 1 TBC 
10 2009 Kabul AUP SAF US 0 1 Detained  
11 2009 Wardak AUP SAF US 2 3 Escaped 
12 2009 Helmand AUP SAF UK 5 6 Escaped 
13 2009 Khost AUP SAF US 0 1 Killed 
14 2009 Badghis ANA  SAF US+ITA 1 2 Detained  
15 2010 Wardak CIV SAF US 2 1 TBC 
16 2010 Balkh AU SAF SWE 2 1 Killed 
17 2010 Ghazni ANA SAF POL 0 1 Escaped  
18 2010 Kandahar ANA SAF ISAF 
(TBC) 
0 0 Killed 
19 2010 Helmand ANA SAF/RPG UK 3 4 Escaped 
20 2010 Balkh ANA SAF US 2 1 Killed 
21 2010 Badghis AUP SAF ESP 2 0 Killed 
22 2010 Kapisa ANA RPG FRA 0 0 Escaped 
23 2010 Zabul AUP IDF  ISAF 
(TBC) 
0 0 Detained 
24 2010 Kandahar ANA SAF US 0 0 Killed 
25 2010 Helmand ANA SAF US 2 0 Escaped 
26 2010 Kandahar AUP SAF/Threat US 0 0 Killed 
27 2010 Nangahar ABP SAF US 6 0 Killed 
28 2010 Paktiya ANA SIED US 2 6 Killed 
29 2010 Kandahar ANA SAF CAN 0 0 NA 
30 2011 Helmand AUP Threat  US 0 0 Killed 
31 2011 Badghis ANA SAF  ITA 1 1 Escaped 
32 2011 Baghlan ANA SAF  GER 3 6 Killed 
33 2011 Kandahar Sec Gg.  SAF  US 2 4 Killed 
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34 2011 Faryab ABP SAF  US 2 0 Killed 
35 2011 Kabul AAF  SAF  US 9 0 Killed 
36 2011 Logar ANA  RC-IED US 0 8 Escaped 
37 2011 Helmand ANCOP SAF  US 2 2 Detained 
38 2011 Paktika ANA  SAF  US 0 1 Escaped 
39 2011 Takhar ANA  SIED  GER 2 4 U/K 
40 2011 Uruzgan ANA  SAF  AUS 1 0 Killed 
41 2011 Farah AUP SAF  ISAF 
(TBC) 
0 0 Detained 
42 2011 Helmand ANA  SAF  US 0 1 Killed 
43 2011 Panjshir NDS  SAF  US 2 1 Killed 
44 2011 Helmand ANA  SAF  UK 1 2 Escaped 
45 2011 Paktika AUP SAF US 1 0 Killed 
46 2011 Zabul NDS Grenade US 0 0 Killed 
47 2011 Kandahar ANA SAF + RPG US 2 4 Detained 
48 2011 Kandahar ANA SAF AUS 3 7 Killed 
49 2011 Uruzgan ANA SAF (?) AUS 0 3 Escaped 
50 2011 Farah ANA SAF US 0 4 Killed 
51 2011 Kapisa ANA SAF FRA 2 0 Killed 
52 2012 Zabul ANA SAF US 1 3 Killed 
53 2012 Kapisa ANA SAF FRA 5 13 Detained 
54 2012 Helmand ANA SAF US 1 0 Detained 
55 2012 Kandahar AUP SAF US+ALB 1 2 Detained 
56 2012 Nangahar ANA SAF US 2 0 Escaped 
57 2012 Kabul AUP SAF US 2 0 Escaped 
58 2012 Kandahar ANA + CIV  SAF US 2 2 2 Killed 1 
detained  
59 2012 Kabul ANA  SAF US 0 0 Detained 
60 2012 Helmand ANA  SAF UK 2 1 Killed 
61 2012 Pktika ALP SAF US 1 0 1 Killed 1 
Detained  
62 2012 Kandahar ANA  SAF BUL 0 0 Killed 
63 2012 Kandahar AUP SAF US 0 2 Killed 
64 2012 Kandahar ANA  SAF US 1 4 Killed 
65 2012 Helmand ANA  SAF US 1 1 Killed 
66 2012 Kunar ANA SAF US 1 2 Escaped 
67 2012 Helmand AUP SAF UK 2 0 1 Killed 1 
Detained  
68 2012 Kandahar AUP SAF US 1 8 2 Killed 1 
Escaped 
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69 2012 Kandahar AUP SAF + SIED US 2 12 Escaped 
70 2012 Helmand ANCOP SAF + PKM UK 3 1 Detained 
71 2012 Wardak ANA SAF US 0 5 Escaped 
72 2012 Herat AUP SAF UK+US 3 1 Killed 
73 2012 Faryab ANA SAF US 0 2 Killed 
74 2012 Kandahar ALP SAF US 0 1 I Detained 1 
Escaped  
75 2012 Paktiya ANA SAF US 1 3 2 Escaped 
76 2012 Laghman ANA SAF US 0 2 Killed 
77 2012 Helmand AUP SAF US 3 1 Escaped 
78 2012 Helmand CIV SAF US 3 1 Detained 
79 2012 Helmand ANA  SAF/RPG US 0 6 2 Killed 1 
detained  
80 2012 Nangahar AUP SAF US 0 1 Escaped 
81 2012 Farah ALP SAF US 2 1 Killed 
82 2012 Kandahar ANA SAF US 0 2 1 Killed 1 
Detained  
83 2012 Kandahar AUP SAF US 1 1 1 Killed 1 
Escaped  
84 2012 Laghman ANA SAF US 2 0 Killed 
85 2012 Uruzgan ANA SAF AUS 3 2 Escaped 
86 2012 Helmand ANCOP SAF UK 2 1 1 Killed 1 
Detained  
87 2012 Zabul AUP SAF US 4 2 1 Killed 5 
Escaped  
88 2012 Helmand ANA SAF LEB 0 6 Detained 
89 2012 Wardak ANA SAF US 2 3 Killed 
90 2012 Kandahar NDS SIED US+CAN 2 6 Killed 
91 2012 Helmand AUP SAF (?) UK 2 1 1 killed 1 
Escaped  
92 2012 Uruzgan AUP SAF US 2 0 Escaped 
93 2012 Farah ANA + AUP SAF ITA 1 3 1 killed 1 
Escaped  
94 2012 Helmand AUP SAF UK 2 0 Escaped 
95 2012 Herat ANA SAF US 0 0 Detained 
96 2012 Badghis ANA SAF / GREN ESP 0 1 Detained 
97 2012 Helmand ANA SAF UK 1 0 Killed 
98 2012 Kabul AUP SAF  US 1 0 Detained 
99 2012 Herat ANA RPG ESP 0 0 Escaped 
100 2013 Helmand ANA SAF/LMG UK 1 6 Killed 
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101 2013 Kapisa ANA SAF + MG US 1 4 Killed 
102 2013 Wardak ANA SAF + PKM US 2 10 Killed 
103 2013 Ghor ANA RPG LIT 0 2 Detained 
104 2013 Farah ANA   US 2 3 Killed 
105 2013 Paktika ANA   US 3 3 Killed 
106 2013 Kandahar ANA SAF SLO 1 7 Escaped 
107 2013 Paktiya ANA SAF US 3 1 Killed 
108 2013 Paktiya ANA  SAF US 1 0 Killed 
109 2013 Zabul ANA SAF US 1 1 Killed 
110 2013 Helmand  CIV    US 0 0 Killed 
111 2013 Paktika  ANA    US 1 1 Escaped 
112 2013 Kabul NDS  SAF AUZ/NZ 0 2 Killed 
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Appendix B: Demographics of Green-on-blue attackers and victims  
 
In addition to collecting data on the green-on-blue event, we also collected data on the 
perpetrators and victims. An outline of this data is provided below. 
 
The green-on-blue attack perpetrator: The codebook contained 25 variables pertaining 
to the perpetrators’ demographics (e.g. name, ethnicity, known siblings) and their role 
within the ANSF (e.g. affiliation, service length).  
The green-on-blue victims: The codebook contained 29 variables relating to the 
individuals who have fallen victim to a green-on-blue attack, including the victim’s status 
(killed vs. wounded) and socio-demographic information (e.g. age, gender). Where 
possible, the victim’s rank, role, area of operations, and the unit they were assigned to 
within ISAF were also collected.  
Results 
Green-on-blue attacks. Over three-quarters (81.3%) of all green-on-blue attacks 
only used small arms fire. In 11 cases, small arms fire was used alongside an additional 
weapon (e.g. an improvised explosive device, rocket propelled grenade; 9.82%). The 
number of perpetrators ranged from 1 to 7 (M = 1.39, SD =1.13). A single perpetrator 
undertook the attack in eighty cases (71.42%). The number of ISAF personnel killed by a 
green-on-blue attack ranged from 0 to 9 (M=1.39, SD=1.42). In 64 green-on-blue attacks 
(57.14%), the perpetrator killed multiple ISAF personnel. Almost one third (31.25%) of 
green-on-blue attacks caused no casualties. The number of ISAF personnel injured 
ranged from 0 to 11 (M=2.03, SD=2.59). In 58% green-on-blue attacks, multiple ISAF 
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personnel were injured. The exact location of the green-on-blue attack could be 
determined for 70 green-on-blue attacks (62.50%). Of these 70 attacks, 43 green-on-blue 
attacks occurred on ISAF base (61.43%), 5 were identified as occurring during a joint 
patrol (7.14%) and 8 (11.43%) were known to have occurred during a joint training 
exercise. The remaining 14 events were classified as “other” and occurred across a wide 
range of locations, including during routine traffic stops, Afghan National Police bases, 
and during convoys trips.  
Victims. Information could be obtained for 127 of the 157 individuals killed by a 
green-on-blue attack (80.89%). Of these 127 victims, age was available for 114 
(89.76%). Victim age ranged from 19 to 66 (M= 30.23, SD = 9.11) and most victims 
were male (91.34%, n = 116). Almost two-thirds (65.35%, n = 83) were from the United 
States, and 18.11% were from the United Kingdom (n = 23). Information on years of 
service was available for 90 individuals (70.86%).  Military experience ranged from 1 to 
28 years (M= 9.52, SD =7.34). Under one-fifth were on their first tour of duty (17.78%, n 
= 16). The status of the working relationship between the victim and the perpetrator could 
be established for 82 victims (64.57%). Of these 82 victims one third (34.14%) worked 
with their attacker at the time or had worked with them in the past (n = 28, 17.83% of full 
sample). 
Perpetrators. Only 1 perpetrator was identified as being female (0.65%; 
however, gender could not be identified for 60.13% of the sample). The perpetrators age 
at the time of the attack was available for 26.79% of this sample (n = 41). Perpetrator age 
ranged from 17 to 62 (M = 25.41, SD = 9.387). Length of ANSF service prior to 
committing an attack was known for 27.45% (n = 42). Within this sample length of 
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service ranged from 1 day to 20 years, with the average length of service being 2.18 years 
(SD = 3.473 years; Median = 1 year).  The affiliation of the perpetrator was known for 88 
offenders (59.9%). Of this subset, the largest majority were members of the Afghan 
National Army (44.31%, n = 39). Almost one third were Afghan National Police 
(30.68%, n = 27). Two perpetrators were Afghan Border Police (2.27%), 7 Afghan Local 
Police (7.95%) and 1 was an interpreter (1.13%). Of the 153 perpetrators, 63 perpetrators 
were killed during or shortly after the attack (41.17%).  
 
